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ABSTRAK
Tulisan ini mencoba untuk mengkaji ulang sejumlah gagasan dari beberapa sarjana 
dan intelektual Indonesia, seperti Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno dan Syamsul Ma’arif, 
yang melihat dan menggambarkan relasi antara Pancasila dengan public reason, salah 
satu konsep politik yang cukup populer dalam studi politik. Sejumlah sarjana dan in-
telektual Indonesia tersebut membingkai Pancasila dengan public reason dalam gam-
baran yang bernuansa sekuler sehingga berpotensi melepaskan kontribusi dari yang 
seharusnya dapat dilakukan oleh agama. Turunan dari public reason yang bermasalah 
tersebut di antaranya (1) prinsip negasi terhadap mayoritarianisme, (2) prinsip negara 
netral, dan (3) prinsip substansial dalam agama (universalisme). Dengan penelaahan 
kualitatif yang merujuk pada sejumlah argumen baik filosofis maupun historis, maka 
dapat ditunjukkan bahwa argumen yang diberikan ketiga sarjana di atas beserta sejum-
lah sarjana lain yang mendukung dan memiliki gagasan serupa, dinilai memiliki sejum-
lah masalah. Kemudian dari penelaahan tersebut, dapat disimpulkan bahwa pemikiran 
yang mendukung relasi Pancasila dengan public reason secara sekuler tidak kuat secara 
argumen dan tidak dipertahankan. Sehingga, relasi Pancasila dengan public reason bisa 
ditelaah ulang dengan konsep yang lebih ramah terhadap kontribusi agama.
Kata kunci: pancasila, public reason, mayoritarianisme, universalisme, negara netral
ABSTRACT
This research tries to review a number of ideas of some Indonesian scholars such as 
Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif, who saw and described the re-
lationship between Pancasila and public reason, one of the popular political concepts 
in political studies. Some Indonesian scholars have linked Pancasila to public reason, 
with a secular nuance, so that it could potentially be free of religious associations. The 
troubled derivatives of public reason include (1) the negation of the principle of ma-
joritarianism, (2) the neutral state principle, and (3) substantial elements in religion, 
such as the principle of universalism. With a qualitative study referring to a number of 
philosophical and historical arguments, it can be shown that the arguments given by the 
three aforementioned scholars, and others who share similar ideas, were considered 
to have a number of issues. From this review, it can be concluded that the thinking that 
supports the relationship between Pancasila and public reason is weak in terms of the 
secular argument. Therefore, the relation between Pancasila and public reason can be 
reviewed with more approachable ideas regarding religious contributions.
*The author is a student of the Postgraduate Program of Islamic Studies, Postgraduate School 
of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates regarding the meaning of Pancasila have gone through 
various stages of discussion. In the Soekarno era, these debates were 
related to the existence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), 
which in many ways contributed to the interpretation of Pancasila. At 
that time, PKI was having an intense debate with Islamic groups repre-
sented by Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama. Both groups attacked each 
other through their different interpretations of the ideology of Pancasila. 
In the Soeharto era, there were hardly any debates on the meaning 
of Pancasila because the interpretation of the philosophy was almost 
completely monopolized by the authorities. Instead, there was a single 
interpretation of Pancasila. The Soeharto government even succeeded 
in forcing a number of Islamic mass organizations to accept Pancasila 
as their sole philosophy while forbidding other ideologies to be used.
Debates over the interpretation of Pancasila began to re-emerge in 
the reform era (reformasi), especially when the practice of democracy 
was adopted on a large scale. Consequently, this had an impact on both 
the arguments and ideas regarding the relationship between state and 
religion, including their inherent dynamics. These debates increasingly 
gained momentum when the House of Representatives (DPR) began 
discussions on the Law of Mass Organizations and presented some 
crucial articles, especially those that proposed Pancasila as the sole phi-
losophy. The peak of the debate about Pancasila and its interpretation 
was when the government created a policy to “get rid of” the Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia organization, which was thought to have a deviant 
understanding of Pancasila and was considered a threat to the existence 
of the state. In such an important time in history, the debates about 
Pancasila and its interpretation became important.
One important part of the interpretation of Pancasila that is often 
discussed by scholars and intellectuals is the concept of public reason 
initiated by John Rawls, which was later linked to Pancasila itself. The 
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notion of public reason is intriguing as this concept is quite famous 
among political theorists and state philosophers. It has been discussed 
and debated many times and has become an ideological battleground 
that challenges the minds of intellectuals. Moreover, a number of Indo-
nesian scholars now often associate the concept of public reason with 
Pancasila in terms of the state ideology. The two emerged for relatively 
similar reasons, which were to bridge the social plurality that exists in 
the midst of a political community. Therefore, it is important to discuss 
and review the concept of public reason in terms of its connection to 
Pancasila.
However, trying to relate Pancasila to public reason, as a number of 
Indonesian scholars have done, is no simple matter. First, even though 
they share the same core concept, namely, diversity, public reason is 
actually a foreign principle that is not necessarily right to adapt because 
different social and historical conditions will come into conflict with 
this philosophy. Public reason comes from a Western tradition with 
a different social and historical background from that of Indonesia. 
Second, the characteristics of public reason tend to be skeptical and 
distanced from religion, whereas Pancasila is characterized by strong, 
explicit influences of religion. This indicates an incongruency (which of 
course must be proven) between the two ideas. This issue can provide 
the first step to reconsider the relation between Pancasila and public 
reason. Therefore, the author has developed two important questions in 
order to examine in more depth the relation between the two concepts: 
(1) How has the relationship between Pancasila and public reason been 
described by a number of Indonesian scholars? (2) Does the relation 
provide valid arguments?
The author argues that a number of scholars, such as Yudi Latif, 
Franz-Magnis Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif, have interpreted Pancasila 
in the framework of public reason with all its derivative forms (anti-
majoritarianism, the neutral state, and universalism). However, public 
reason with its three derivative forms has problems that have implica-
tions for the validity of the relationship between Pancasila and public 
reason, which the author will discuss in more detail. These problems 
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have forced Indonesian scholars to think and act in a critical manner 
in terms of how the two concepts are related and how Pancasila is in-
terpreted in terms of public reason.
R ESEA RCH METHOD
This study is divided into two parts. The first part describes a num-
ber of scholars who support and see Pancasila as having a strong rela-
tionship with public reason. The selected scholars include Yudi Latif, 
Franz Magnis-Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif. This section will examine 
how some Indonesian scholars constructed their arguments to justify 
the relationship between Pancasila and public reason. The second dis-
cussion will review and determine whether the arguments put forward 
by the aforementioned scholars do indeed show that there are strong 
relations between Pancasila and public reason. To analyze the train of 
thought of the scholars, philosophical and historical approaches are 
used. These approaches will also review the commonly existing deriva-
tives of the idea of public reason, i.e., (1) the concept of the negation of 
majoritarianism, (2) the concept of a neutral state, and (3) the substan-
tial principle of religion (universalism).
PUBLIC R EASON A ND PA NCA SIL A :  A N 
INTELLECTUA L PERSPECTI V E
The concept of public reason in the context of its true meaning 
had emerged long before Rawls used it. A number of classical politi-
cal thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, are said to 
have referred to public reason as an important element in the study of 
political philosophy. Hobbes, for example, speaks of public reason in the 
context of an absolute state, with many disagreements about social con-
ditions, particularly those regarding beliefs or religious doctrines. Such 
situations, for Hobbes, require an arbitrator to be an absolute mediator, 
which is the state. Here the state serves as the public reason that medi-
ates conflicts or controversies. Yet the meaning of public reason here 
is far from the meaning used by modern political scholars, as public 
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reason falls under state absolutism, although initially Hobbes wanted 
to mediate the diversity of various religious beliefs within society. This 
is a similar situation to that of the emergence of the concept of public 
reason (Chambers 2009, 352–354).
Immanuel Kant, a scholar well known for the concept of the public 
use of reason, is considered to be the closest to the meaning of modern 
public reason. The core idea of the public use of reason is what makes 
an individual or community know how they should act. For Kant, the 
public use of reason is an idea that is distinct from the group and moves 
toward universalism. Thus, Kant directs public reason to the truth or 
reason produced through persuasion, arguments, and criticism, which 
all exist as a result of freedom. In other words, public reason arises in 
different ways when individuals are able to communicate and argue 
in a peaceful manner in order to reach mutually agreed resolutions 
(Chambers 2009, 363).
This idea developed by Kant was then utilized by Rawls to address 
questions and issues in diverse societies (Rawls 1996, 213–214).1 How 
are diverse communities able to maintain their stability, while diversity 
may create difficult conflicts? One of Rawls’s answers is with public rea-
son. In general, Rawls is no different from Kant who divides reason into 
two major groups, namely, non-public reasoning and public reasoning. 
A policy or political decision can achieve legitimacy if such a policy is 
mutually acceptable and comprehensible. This cannot be fulfilled by 
non-public reasoning. Therefore, Rawls limits the role of non-public 
reasoning, which he calls a comprehensive doctrine. Through avoid-
ance of non-public reasoning and by utilizing public reason, Rawls 
envisions a society that is stable and harmonious because the estab-
lished policies are clear and acceptable to the public, as a result of the 
maximum avoidance of group logic (Sikka 2016, 94). It is as part of this 
framework that religious doctrine has no legitimacy because it is seen as 
partial, not comprehensible, and not universally accepted. Nevertheless, 
1 In Political Liberalism, Rawls acknowledges that the concept of public reason is not a new 
concept but an old one that has often been discussed by political philosophers, one of whom 
is Immanuel Kant.
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Rawls adds an important point to his concept of public reason by provid-
ing a way for religion to exist in the public sphere as long as it provides a 
comprehensive doctrinal argument (one of which is religion) supported 
by the argument of public reason: a proviso (Sikka 2016, 94–95).
The issue of public reason has been tackled by thinkers such as Jür-
gen Habermas. Unlike Rawls, Habermas criticizes the proviso because 
he thinks that it does not satisfy religious groups. Therefore, he intro-
duced the concept of a translation proviso. Here, religious arguments 
can become part of a formal institution (state) if pure religious language 
is adapted into an understandable language for the public. Religious 
doctrine is not immediately rejected, but embraced, so that it can be-
come accessible to all members of a community, as it also potentially 
contains some truth. For Habermas, Rawls’s public reason is a Kantian 
form that does not support the formation of a pluralistic cosmopolitan 
society, especially for those who are less able to have a dialogue about 
religion (Redhead 2015, 87–88). However, Rawls’s proviso and Haber-
mas’s translation proviso do not differ significantly (Sikka 2016, 95).
Henceforth, the concept of public reason became better known as 
one that seeks neutrality from elements that favor particular groups, 
such as religious doctrine. Kevin Vallier describes public reason as a 
concept that requires an action or established policy to be generally 
acceptable and understandable (accessible) and to be based on logical 
reasoning. Religion or religious doctrine is seen as an inaccessible argu-
ment (Vallier 2011, 366–368), so in the realm of public reason, religion 
often has no place. Why is that so? This is related to the fact that diver-
sity in communities or societies is assumed to be a positive thing, but 
it can be different and even contradictory. To resolve this situation, the 
concept of public reason emerged as a solution.
A number of Indonesian scholars have discussed issues regarding the 
relationship between Pancasila and public reason. This indicates that 
the concept of public reason is seen as interesting and can be used as 
a kind of interpretation of the idea of  Pancasila itself. Yudi Latif first 
discussed it in his book, “State of Plenary: Pancasila History, Ratio-
nality and Actuality.” He touched on this issue, particularly when he 
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discussed the idea of the first principle of Pancasila, Belief in the One 
and Only God. Latif writes that communities that interact with and 
participate in a joint political community can aspire to religious values, 
but when they enter an agreement, the next step is the process of public 
reason or public deliberation and not religious doctrine. This process is 
considered important, as public policy resulting from public reason or 
public deliberation is based on a rational, impartial attitude with broad 
participation and inclusive characters (Latif 2011, 109).
Before discussing public reason, Latif first highlighted the dichot-
omy surrounding the position of religion and the state. First, religion 
can be placed together with or fused with the state; this is commonly 
referred to as a theocracy or the state based on a particular religion. 
Another form of this concept is the existence of an official religion in 
a political community which is recognized as a reference for policies 
related to the public sphere. Second, a country can be very separatist in 
terms of the position of religion when dealing with the state. This kind 
of country is commonly referred to as a secular state that separates the 
role of religion from the state. Religious privatization is a compulsory 
song that must be sung in the style of a secular state. Therefore, such 
a country is not too concerned with religion, because it does not seem 
to have a formal influence or play an important role when the moving 
wheel of the state guides people’s lives. These two systems are not ap-
proved by Latif. He prefers a third path, neither fusion nor separation, 
but differentiation (Latif 2011, 97–109).
This option of differentiation then led Latif to become an intermedi-
ary concerning the issue of the position of religion and the state. But 
it seems that Latif adopted quite a lot of ideas from other figures such 
as Jose Casanova, Robert N. Bellah, and Alfred Stepan. The idea of 
differentiation was taken from Casanova, whereas from Bellah, Latif 
obviously derived the idea of civil religion. As for Stepan, it can be said 
that Latif took the idea of twin toleration.
When discussing the extent of how religion could relate to the state, 
Latif seemed to almost combine the ideas of the three intermediary 
thinkers. The idea of civil religion, borrowed from Bellah, emerged 
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when Latif described the proximity of Pancasila to the idea of civil 
religion, which could involve religious universalism and could be dis-
tinguished from religion. With this approach, religion is expected to be 
able to become the basis of the state’s political life in its spirit of mor-
alism without making a particular religion the main reference (Latif, 
2011, 110).
 Casanova’s idea of differentiation became apparent when Latif as-
serted the rejection of the separation of religion from the state, but 
agreed with the differentiation between religious and state authorities 
(Latif 2011, 105–109). In this idea of differentiation, religious author-
ity is described differently from state authority. Religious authority is 
no longer monopolistic and dominant, as religious institutions in the 
medieval West were. Now religion must deal with other institutions and 
even share authority and influence. Religion that was once dominant 
in many aspects, such as theology, economics, politics, and science, has 
now lost its dominance. This is what Casanova later termed differentia-
tion (Knoblauch et al. 2011, 5 and Casanova 2008, 105).
Although this differentiation states that religion can lose its influ-
ence compared with what happened in the era of medieval Europe, 
religion and the public sphere are not totally separated. Religion can 
still play a role in the public sphere and can even influence the politi-
cal state or community (Knoblauch et al. 2011, 14). This is also what 
Latif supported later because, for him, differentiation does not mean 
total separation or privatization of religion (Latif 2011, 107). Those are 
two things that Latif considered incompatible with the reality of life in 
almost all countries.
After establishing this concept of differentiation, Latif then strength-
ened it with the idea of  twin toleration initiated by Alfred Stepan. Not 
much different from Casanova, Stepan was a political expert who also 
viewed secularization with the meaning of privatization or total separa-
tion between religion and the public sphere (in this context, the state), 
which has not been fully implemented in the practice of many Western 
countries. In other words, it is not entirely relevant. Stepan conducted 
a study of the constitution of Western countries and later concluded 
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that many Western countries (especially in the European region) did 
not fully carry out secularization in terms of the total separation of re-
ligion and state. A number of countries even have officially established 
churches such as Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Norway 
(Stepan and Linz 2013, 17). This argument is used by Latif who also 
wants to show that the separation and privatization of religion is no 
longer relevant.
Not only does Latif draw sociological conclusions and political facts, 
but he also provides a prescriptive interpretation that in order to main-
tain twin toleration, religious ideas must be inspirational, and they must 
undergo a process of public reason or public deliberation. Religious 
doctrine should not simply refer directly to the scriptures, but must 
have some substance, so as to fulfill rational and impartial requirements 
(Latif 2011, 109). This is what Latif meant by, “To make religion use-
ful for democratic public life that must be brought to life is the ethical 
and prophetic mission of a universal religion, which is directed towards 
the realization of mutual benefit by fulfilling deliberative principles.” 
(Latif 2011, 120).
With this description, a logical flow of Latif ’s view of Pancasila can 
be made by utilizing the concept of public reason. It starts by placing 
Pancasila as a civil religion that requires it not to be explored in the 
form of doctrinal or partial aspirations. At this level, all religions can 
meet, because they are considered to have the same universalistic spirit. 
The position of religion that plays a role in universal values  is then syn-
ergized with the conception of differentiation that requires religion to 
not simply passively exist in the private domain without forging strong 
public relations, but rather requires it to also be active in the public 
sphere. However, the public sphere in question is more to do with the 
empowerment of civil society, the strengthening of society, the control 
of state absolutism, and the defense of the independence of others. 
Religion is not recommended to be too close to the state or included in 
the formulation of state policies. If it is “forced” to enter this process, it 
must develop through public reason or public deliberation that requires 
rationality and impartiality.
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Second, we turn to Syamsul Ma’arif who wrote an article entitled 
“The Relation between Religion and Politics According to Rawls: Anal-
ysis of Pancasila as a Public Reason” (Ma’arif 2006). The style of think-
ing in Ma’arif ’s article barely exceeded what was initiated by Rawls, 
starting from the reality of plural community, the original position 
(posisi azali), to public reason. These concepts were used by Ma’arif 
to research, analyze, and even solve state problems such as relations 
between religion and state and between groups of people.
Before arriving at public reason, Ma’arif first discussed Pancasila 
as a common ground as seen through the background of Indonesian 
people who are diverse in religions, tribes, and ethnicities. Moreover, 
the historical existence of Pancasila did emerge from a discussion by 
the founding fathers of Indonesia in the Investigating Committee for 
Preparatory work for Independence (BPUPKI) to reach an agreement 
regarding the basis of the country’s philosophy. At that time, some na-
tionalists wanted a national state that was not based on religion, whereas 
Muslims wanted the foundation of the state to be Islamic. Then came 
the ideas of Sukarno’s Pancasila that were taken as the founding prin-
ciples, and the Jakarta Charter was then formulated (Ma’arif 2006, 193).
The elimination of seven words in the Jakarta Charter, in Ma’arif ’s 
view, was a reflection of the attitude of the founding fathers, especially 
those from the Islamic group, and this showed their decision toward the 
original position as initiated by Rawls. This attitude intended to negate 
interest biases, partial values, and attributes. This thinking behind the 
original position then implied that all residents with all their various 
social identities were in a free and equal position. More specifically, 
there was no majority dictatorship and minority tyranny. What existed 
was only a common interest that could only be understood together 
(Ma’arif 2006, 195).
What is interesting is that Ma’arif establishes public reason as a way 
of reaching common ground (Pancasila) by ignoring the multi-inter-
pretative characteristics of Pancasila. All discourses such as Pancasila 
that exist in a diverse country must include public reason as their basis. 
Religious arguments cannot be incorporated as long as they have not 
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gone through the process of substantiation, extracting the substance 
from religious teachings that were previously not accepted as universal 
by other groups. The reason behind the absence of religion in public 
discourse is based on the diversity of groups in a community. This 
diversity requires that a certain comprehensive doctrine, religion, or 
philosophy may not necessarily be understood and accepted by others. 
With the medium of public reason, it is expected that the conditions 
of non-understanding and non-acceptability can be overcome so that 
political deadlock in plural societies can also be avoided (Ma’arif 2006, 
197).
Third, Franz Magnis-Suseno also touched on the relation between 
Pancasila and John Rawls’s ideas, especially regarding overlapping con-
sensus. In an article entitled “John Rawls, Justice and Pancasila,” Mag-
nis-Suseno juxtaposes Pancasila as a national agreement initiated by a 
consensus of Rawls’s ideas around diverse or plural societies (Magnis-
Suseno 2015, 172–173). This diverse society is a reasonable society, one 
in which people have the courage to sit together in order to abandon a 
comprehensive doctrine then find a way to reach an agreement between 
many parties. This is certainly different from an unreasonable group, 
a community group that imposes itself, lives only according to its own 
religious doctrine, but also wants other groups to carry out the same 
comprehensive doctrine. This situation then brought reasonable soci-
eties to a situation called the overlapping consensus (Magnis-Suseno 
2015, 170).
After establishing that Pancasila is an overlapping consensus, it is 
not too difficult to find traces of public reason in Magnis-Suseno’s ideas 
in relation to Pancasila and groups in Indonesia, including religious 
groups. This is because public reason with overlapping consensus in the 
Rawlsian tradition is an almost inseparable package. It can even be said 
that public reason is a logical consequence of overlapping consensus. 
How is it possible to separate public reason from Rawlsian thought (in-
cluding Franz Magnis-Suseno) if from the beginning this overlapping 
agreement requires neutral claims such as those made by Rawls?
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Therefore, it is almost impossible to separate public reason from 
overlapping consensus, as evidenced by Magnis-Suseno’s logic. This 
evidence can be seen when Magnis-Suseno argued about the impor-
tance of neutrality and the loss of the comprehensive doctrine of cer-
tain religious groups as regards public policy. One example was when 
Magnis-Suseno did not agree with the implementation of a number of 
local regulations concerning obligations regarding clothing on certain 
days for religious reasons. For him, it was a violation of the Indonesian 
plurality concerning neutrality and diversity (Magnis-Suseno 2015, 150), 
a very Rawlsian thing. Even in executive, legislative, and judicial areas, 
religion is also not allowed to play a part. Religion and its institutions 
can only enter the public sphere that is related to civil society, not to 
the territory of the country.2
Magnis-Suseno does not agree with secularization in the context of 
religious privatization, where religion does not have an important role 
and influence in the public sphere. For Magnis-Suseno, what can be 
done is to reduce the influence of religion on state policy. Apparently, 
besides Rawls, the influence of Casanova and Habermas was felt in 
Magnis-Suseno’s ideas because they are opponents of the secularization 
theory in terms of religious privatization. Both think that the role of 
religion can be expanded and must not be narrowed to simply private 
spaces.
THE R EL ATIONSHIP BET W EEN PUBLIC R EASON 
A ND PA NCA SIL A  A ND ITS CR ITICISM
When examined carefully, there are at least three conclusions that 
can be drawn from the views of the above scholars regarding the con-
sequences of the concept of public reason. Furthermore, the conse-
quences become a kind of mandatory axiom that has implications in 
providing a basis for the interpretation of Pancasila. Here, the relation 
2 For further details, see the interview results with Franz Magnis-Suseno summarized in Con-
versation with Franz Magnis-Suseno pp. 8–10. Accessible at http://nurcholishmadjid.org/assets/
pdf/pengaruh/Percakapan-dengan-Franz-Magnis-Suseno.pdf (accessed on 22 December 2018).
195EXAMINING PANCASILA’S POSITION IN THE PUBLIC REASON SCHEME
between Pancasila and public reason can be evidenced in the views of 
the three scholars cited above.
First is the concept of negating majoritarianism. Supporters of public 
reason have become almost totally opposed to the idea of majoritarian-
ism. Majoritarianism is interpreted as a socio-political identity that is 
embedded in or pinned to a community group that then totally domi-
nates and thus can be distinguished from other community groups. 
The early initiators of public reason, such as Rawls and Habermas, 
were quite skeptical about majoritarianism in the life of the political 
identity of the nation. This is evident from the attitude of those who 
do not base themselves in certain comprehensive doctrines (religious 
or philosophical doctrines) and prefer other paths that are seen to ac-
commodate diversity (Bailey and Gentile 2015, 4–11).
In a plural society, which has become Rawls’s vision, the big idea 
of political liberalism (including original position, overlapping consen-
sus, and public reason) is clearly a concept that does not have room 
for majoritarianism. This concept does not allow for a society with 
a single identity that has its own conception of goodness that is then 
applied or even forced into the body of the political community as a 
whole. In contrast, what happens is that society is organized freely and 
equally without being based on the concept of the majority–minority 
(Koppelman 2017, 289–290). Rawls had the idea to form such a society 
because in a political community, society has become so diverse that it 
then challenges life’s stability and harmony. It is no wonder then that 
the question arises of how to make the community stable in the midst 
of this diversity.
In the effort to create a stable society in the midst of this diversity, 
there also exists skepticism and there is an almost self-evident con-
clusion that majoritarianism will lead to something bad. This is what 
Latif, Ma’arif, and Magnis-Suseno all think. All three imagine a situa-
tion where majoritarianism will cause injustice, authoritarianism, and 
oppression. Latif said that the representation of one religious group 
can have a negative impact in terms of a decline in the plurality of 
nationalities, which is one of the Indonesian characteristics. Majori-
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tarianism is associated with a religious state, so a brief conclusion can 
be reached that states that every instance of majoritarianism, in the 
context of Pancasila, will always be directly proportional to the Islamic 
state (Latif 2011, 111).
Magnis-Suseno also gave a not very positive description of majori-
tarianism by stating that partiality toward a group through a policy is 
seen as being partial to an exclusive ideology that must be avoided and 
is contrary to the diversity of the nation. An example is the wearing of 
certain religious clothing that exists in a number of local regulations 
(Magnis-Suseno 2015, 150). Such a description of majoritarianism is not 
actually separated from the problems that should have been resolved in 
the first place so that the conclusions and descriptions used are more 
appropriate, or at least majoritarianism can be put in its place. Some 
of these problems include historical bias, different facts according to 
various political thinkers, and interpretations of the nation’s founders 
(originalism).
Concerns about majoritarianism can actually be said to contain his-
torical biases that may not necessarily be justified as different historicity. 
This is because the majoritarianism that is promoted by thinkers and 
intellectuals is often related to traumatic Western historicity regarding 
dark medieval situations. Therefore, it is not surprising that the intellec-
tuals promoting the philosophy of diversity, in other words, those who 
object to majoritarianism such as Rawls, will be seen talking about and 
showing their antipathy to medieval Western history dominated by the 
power of religious institutions. Rawls felt the need to remind us of the 
dangerous situation that could occur if religion or religious institutions 
were given a predominant role in the state. He also convincingly said 
that liberalism generally had its roots in the Church Reform move-
ment and was known as one of the contributors that undermined the 
power of religious institutions (Laborde 2017, 92). This further shows 
that historical trauma in general cannot be erased from the memory of 
intellectuals who initiated theories of diversity, although there is a great 
distance between the era of the hegemony of religious institutions in 
Europe and the modern era.
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The same attitude was also shown by Cecile Laborde, a political 
theorist supporting liberal egalitarianism. This attitude supports the 
state in not endorsing certain religions or religious institutions in re-
lation to the state. When supporting the idea of  liberal egalitarian-
ism, Laborde apparently could not let go of the historical trauma of 
the West’s dark history. This can be detected from the way in which 
Laborde brought up Locke’s defense of the plurality of understandings 
from the grip of the monopoly of religious institutions and the need 
to trim the role of religion in the public sphere (Laborde 2017, 15). 
Laborde frankly acknowledged that one reason why the idea emerged 
regarding liberating the state from the influence of a comprehensive 
doctrine such as religion is that there had been acute conflicts in the 
past, so liberal countries needed a standpoint that did not refer to one 
religious doctrine (Laborde 2018, 5). Laborde was referring to the his-
tory of religious wars and the hegemony of religious institutions in the 
West in the Middle Ages.
So, it can be said that often Western thinkers who try to stay away 
from majoritarianism, especially when carried out by religion or reli-
gious institutions, have directly or indirectly experienced their own 
historical trauma. This historical bias is then multiplied in the many 
analyses and philosophies of the thinkers that are then reproduced in 
the ideas and logic of intellectuals, both directly and indirectly. A par-
ticular criticism of the intellectuals who oppose majoritarianism is the 
self-evident conclusion that majoritarianism, especially that practiced 
by religious groups, will lead to authoritarianism and the oppression 
of minority groups. It is an argument that is very traumatic in terms 
of history, even though not all forms of majoritarianism will lead to 
authoritarianism.
This historical trauma cannot necessarily be justified by other histo-
ries. The Ottoman government of Turkey, for example, was very tolerant 
of the minorities of a number of religious followers so they could carry 
out their religious internal regulations under the leadership of religious 
leaders (Kia 2011, 112 and Hefner 2014, 640). Another example is the 
government of Umar ibn Khattab who developed a life of tolerance 
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toward Christian minority groups in Jerusalem through the Aelia Agree-
ment (Rubin 2011, 52).
Moreover, majoritarianism does not always exist in tandem with a 
religious state. Majoritarianism, to a certain extent, can also co-exist 
with a system of other ideas, including liberalism. A number of multi-
culturalist liberal intellectuals who defend diversity are not narrowed 
by the majoritarianism logic previously rejected by intellectuals who 
tended to be liberal. The logic of majoritarianism, as discussed by lib-
eral multiculturalists, is related to the extent to which liberalism can 
accommodate religious minorities, when in liberal political communi-
ties, these religious minorities have aspirations and practices that are 
contrary to the liberal majority.
In addressing this question, political theorists started to practice the 
logic of majoritarianism, as evidenced by Will Kymlicka, Joseph Raz, 
and Robert Quong. Kymlicka’s viewpoint that includes the logic of 
majoritarianism can be seen when he talks about a number of religious 
minorities such as the Hutterite or the Amish who have different views 
to liberalism; they can even be thought of as violating the principles 
of liberalism. The case referred to by Kymlicka was one that occurred 
in the midst of the Hutterite community when members who left were 
then asked to give up their ownership rights. This obligation to give up 
ownership of property, by the Hutterite community, was seen as a conse-
quence of the members leaving the group. When the case was brought 
to court, the Hutterite community won. This was later criticized by 
Kymlicka who said that the decision was wrong, because the Hutterite 
minority community was seen as violating the principle of liberalism 
held by the majority (Cohen-Almagor 2018, 19).
Kymlicka did not take steps against religious minorities that tended 
to be illiberal, but he continued to provide a broad space for liberalism 
and for activists who were committed to the principles of liberalism. 
This helped to maintain social pressure so that principles of liberalism, 
as shared by the majority, were accepted by minority groups. If religious 
minorities had practiced severe violations such as slavery, genocide, and 
mass murder, the state may have intervened (Courtois 2008, 48).
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Moreover, Kymlicka was very skeptical of internal restrictions that 
were often practiced by religious minorities.3 On another occasion, he 
strongly discouraged the state from providing group rights in the context 
of internal restrictions. He took this action because he did not want the 
rights of minority groups to undermine the principles of liberalism held 
by the majority (Stjernfelt 2012, 56).
A similar attitude is also held by Raz on more or less the same issue, 
which is the extent to which liberalism, as held by the majority, has 
a number of rights that must be respected. This is reflected in Raz’s 
idea that emphasizes the importance of the liberal majority, promotes 
the understanding of secularism, and has an obligation to promote 
the value of the majority in the context of a state, so that the state as a 
representation of liberal values becomes the guardian of liberalism. Any 
group that rejects secularism is not a liberal group (Harding 2014, 248).
Indeed, Raz does not recommend non-liberal groups to use repres-
sive actions that cause them to be oppressed and depressed. However, 
minority groups are encouraged to continue to integrate with the domi-
nant liberal values. Raz’s attitude shows that the dominant liberal values 
must be supported and cannot be defeated by minority values when 
there is a clash between the two (Kim 2015, 72).
The same attitude is also shown by Jonathan Quong. This contem-
porary liberal thinker also cannot tolerate the notion of illiberal minori-
ties who have the right to justify the illiberalism of the minorities. In 
Quong’s view, minority groups can only have rights related to citizen-
ship. Their citizenship rights cannot be eliminated simply because the 
group rejects liberalism. However, these minorities do not have the 
right to hold illiberal rights. Illiberal rights are those used to practice 
activities or objectives that do not respect the principles of freedom and 
equality. Such groups cannot have rights if they continue to carry out 
illiberalism (Ekeli 2012, 186).
3 Group rights, in the context of providing limitations, are exercised by a group (particularly 
minority groups) for the rights of its members in order to maintain internal harmony and sta-
bilization.
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For Quong, the system of liberal ideas has the privilege of limiting 
the use of a right. This means that a certain group has rights, except in 
contexts where the group cannot exercise their right as a way of pursu-
ing non-liberal objectives, or in Quong’s terminology, it is called an 
unreasonable objective. Some concrete examples are given by Quong, 
such as not having the right to enact hate speech or not having the 
right to join an organization or political party that is racist. Additionally, 
there is no right to fight for a racist party to be elected in the general 
election (Ekeli 2012, 187).
For political liberals such as Quong, a rather restrictive method can 
only be carried out if a group or person has exceeded what is called 
public justification that includes several things, such as (1) the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, (2) reasonable citizens, (3) political conception, 
(4) overlapping consensus, and (5) public reason. Therefore, illiberal 
citizens, in Quong’s terminology, are known as unreasonable citizens 
and are included in one of the conditions for a restriction to be applied. 
This is where we can see the relevance of majoritarianism in Quong’s 
ideas (Vallier 2017, 177).
Examples of the attitudes of liberals increasingly show that majori-
tarianism not only is the monopoly of religious institutions or religious 
ideas but also lives and develops in the intellectual environment of liber-
als. In such a situation, it is no exaggeration to say that the majoritari-
anism that is often pinned to religious groups, and also often accused 
of being authoritarian, has now become irrelevant or simply a myth 
that is more stigmatized than factual. In the end, the rivals of religious 
groups, such as liberals, also adopt majoritarianism without hesitation.
It could also be that the existence and development of majoritarian-
ism among Western liberals proves that majoritarianism is a destiny or 
intellectual way of thinking. It can be seen how the majority must re-
main being a factor that is considered even a determinant in the end of 
a policy, agreement, or legal adoption. Therefore, the point that should 
be a common concern, especially in Pancasila, is not the total rejection 
of majoritarianism, but rather the rejection of a type of majoritarianism 
that has turned authoritarian and tyrannical. Likewise, we should reject 
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the claim that every type of majoritarianism will certainly turn out to be 
authoritarian. Taking into account these concerns, majoritarianism can 
be put back in its proper place, without having to negate it totally. The 
total negation and bad press of majoritarianism, as often carried out by 
liberals, will eventually “backfire,” as is happening with a number of 
liberal intellectuals who eventually adopted majoritarianism.
Thus, trying to relate Pancasila to public reason, which then has 
consequences for anti-majoritarianism, seems inappropriate. Moreover, 
majoritarianism has also been adopted by liberals as a consequence of 
the demands of society. This should also apply to Pancasila. Therefore, 
Pancasila cannot be separated from majoritarianism in certain regards 
as with other ideas. Separating Pancasila from majoritarianism can 
actually lead to the neglect of society’s ideals while leading to an ahis-
torical attitude toward the will of the nation’s founders, as majoritarian-
ism can be traced back to the interpretation of a number of founding 
fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman Singodimedjo, 
and Mohammad Natsir.
 Wahid Hasyim, despite being mentioned as having agreed to the 
omission of seven words in the Jakarta Charter, still has the spirit to 
fight for Islamic values (as the majority) without having to tyrannize 
the minorities. For him, fighting for Islamic values (Shari’a) can be 
done in a democratic way, between divinity and popular sovereignty. 
Moreover, another important thing is to do this without causing harm 
to minorities (Hasyim 2015, 938).4
Likewise, Agus Salim requires that public policies and laws issued by 
the state do not conflict with the teachings of the scriptures, especially 
the Qur’an. He even justifies his argument by citing the verse from al-
Qur’an (Salim 1984, 438).5 This reflects Agus Salim’s attitude, which 
4 Wahid Hasyim wrote, “The desire of Muslims as the largest group and our nation will revive 
the religious shari’a given good paths and channels, but from the other side the principle of 
democracy is maintained so that the desire does not harm other groups. If here is explained 
about the existence of a compromise with democracy, it does not mean that if there is no com-
promise, there will certainly be things that are urgent and detrimental to the small number of 
religiously motivated groups.”
5 Agus Salim wrote, “If it will be in accordance with our basis of Pancasila, regardless of the 
directions that are important to the various religious thoughts, and whatever efforts to try or fight 
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considers the majority as one of the important aspects in making the 
laws that will affect the politics of the state.
Other Islamic figures also agreed with Wahid Hasyim and Agus 
Salim, as indicated by Kasman Singodimedjo. As a member of the PPKI 
(Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) and the first 
Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, Kasman argues that the 
phrase “Belief in the One and Only God” has a strong meaning for the 
implementation of the Shari’a. Such a relation is inseparable because 
of either the sociological reality, where the majority is Muslims, or 
the interpretation of the constitutional language. That is why Kasman 
appealed to the Islamic community to be not too concerned with the 
changes in the phrase of the first principle (sila) of the Jakarta Charter 
by eliminating the seven words to be “Belief in the One and Only God” 
(Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman 1981, 124–127).6
Singodimedjo’s interpretation was reinforced by the views of Mo-
hammad Natsir, the leader of Masyumi and the first Prime Minister 
of the parliamentary cabinet after the dissolution of the RIS (Repub-
lic of United States of Indonesia). He believes that the interpretation 
of Pancasila cannot and should not conflict with religious teachings, 
especially Islam, as embraced by the majority of Indonesian citizens. 
For him, the interpretation of Pancasila that is contrary to Islam will 
be problematic and contradictory to the substance of Pancasila itself 
(Natsir 1978, 246–247).7
for each of their objectives, the first and foremost, they cannot violate the first basic principle, 
i.e., Belief in the One Supreme God. Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to deviate from 
the religious laws which are based on the revelation rather than the God Almighty according 
to the word of Allah in Al-Qur’an three consecutive times, namely S. Almaidah.”
6 Kasman Singodimedjo wrote, “And all interpretations of the Belief in the One Supreme God, 
both according to their historical interpretation and their meanings and understandings, are in 
accordance with the interpretation given by Islam, namely the prevailing religion and treated 
in Indonesia, the religion adhered to by more than 90 percent.” Kasman wrote again, “They 
forget, that God Almighty in Pancasila and the Constitution guarantees the upholding of God’s 
law, namely Islam with its manifestations (al-Quran).”
7 Mohammad Natsir wrote, “We hope that Pancasila in its journey of seeking content since it 
was established, will not be filled with teachings that oppose al-Quran. Divine revelations that 
have for centuries become the blood of flesh for most of our nation. And it should also not be 
used to oppose the implementation of the rules and teachings contained in al-Quran … which 
they want to contribute the content to the formation and development of the nation and state 
in a parliamentary and democratic way.”
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Considering that the anti-majoritarianism attitude tends to contain 
an acute historical bias and that majoritarianism is a social disposition 
that is adopted by almost all existing systems of ideas and considers the 
interpretations of the founding fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus 
Salim, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Mohammad Natsir, the attitude 
of total rejection of majoritarianism is one that is not philosophically 
valid and cannot be defended. What is needed is not total rejection of 
majoritarianism, but proper introduction at the right moment.
Second is the principle of a neutral state. The adoption of public 
reason also requires groups within a diverse political community to be 
neutral and distance themselves from certain values or comprehensive 
doctrines, whether from a religion or a philosophy. This certainty can 
be seen from the attitudes of Latif and Magnis-Suseno, which require 
a neutral policy in terms of the state. Latif said that the state must not 
be inclined to one single religion so that it will not only be represented 
by one religion (Latif 2011, 119).
This issue of a neutral state has also become a fierce point of discus-
sion between contemporary political theorists. The question that re-
volves around the issue of neutrality is what is meant exactly by neutral-
ity. Furthermore, is it possible for neutrality to be achieved? In general, 
neutrality has at least four meanings. The first meaning is neutrality 
of outcome, i.e., the results of a policy or political decision do not have 
an impact only on certain groups. When it affects only certain groups, 
the neutrality of outcomes cannot be achieved. The second is neutrality 
of opportunity, the claim that all ways of life, doctrines, or groups are 
given equal opportunities in order to guarantee freedom and equality. 
Next, is neutrality of justification, namely, the claim that new policies 
can be achieved neutrally if policies or decisions do not use justifica-
tions that come from certain groups within a political community. The 
last is neutrality of aim, the claim that a new neutrality will be achieved 
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if the issued policies or political decisions do not promote the values or 
conceptions of goodness that certain groups hold (Franken 2016, 3–5).
Of the four variants of neutrality, the last two neutralities (justifica-
tion and aim) are variants that are often discussed by scholars. The 
first two variants, neutrality of outcome and opportunity, tend to be 
abandoned because they are considered difficult to achieve. Neutrality 
of outcome cannot be achieved because it is considered difficult to real-
ize consistently in practice. It is deemed difficult as sometimes a policy 
requires segmentation. For example, smoking bans in certain areas will 
provide less space for smokers than for non-smokers. Non-smokers can 
carry out their activities anywhere, whereas smoker segmentation means 
that smokers have less space because they are prohibited in various 
public spheres, so the policy is considered not neutral to smokers. The 
same applies to neutrality of opportunity. The concept of neutrality that 
tries to provide equal space and freedom is unable to provide equality 
and freedom to all ideas of value and goodness that are often adopted 
by certain groups (Franken 2016, 5).
For these reasons, Franken states that it is more possible to maintain 
neutrality of justification and aim than neutrality of outcome and op-
portunity. But can neutrality of justification and aim be maintained 
or valid as concepts that are indeed worth developing? This question 
results in a certain degree of doubt and can be raised again as a method 
of evaluating the concept of a neutral state that has been firmly held by 
liberals and a number of Indonesian intellectuals.
Doubts about the validity of neutrality of justification arose when 
Rawls, a defender of neutrality of justification, failed to escape the 
partiality of certain ideas of goodness. In this context, this is a concept 
of liberal goodness. At first, Rawls was quite confident that the ideas of 
political liberalism that he built along with various microconceptions 
(public reason, overlapping consensus, veils of ignorance, and others) 
could be neutral as they were based on universal equality and freedom 
for all. However, when talking about political liberalism, Rawls had to 
rely on the notion of capacity as a concept of goodness, one which gives 
individuals the freedom to form, revise, and pursue a concept of good-
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ness that is typical of the characteristics of liberal autonomy. As a result, 
Rawls was stuck in the autonomy trap that he has previously refused. 
Autonomy is indeed the basis of liberalism, which is as important as 
other bases of liberalism (Franken 2016, 17).
To give a concrete example, Rawls’s inconsistency was seen in the 
case of Wisconsin V. Yoder when the Supreme Court of the United 
States of America ruled that children aged 14 years and over from 
Amish minority groups were excluded from the obligation to study. 
For Rawls, the Supreme Court’s decision was not right because liberal 
countries must provide a basis for capacity as a concept of goodness 
so that individuals may choose, revise, and pursue this in their lives. 
Moreover, it can easily be provided to its citizens by having compul-
sory education. But according to Franken, Rawls cannot be neutral 
because when he convinced the state to participate in encouraging 
the principles of autonomous liberalism (by educating its citizens to 
be autonomous in their attitude and manner), he had taken sides with 
autonomous liberalism (Franken 2016, 18).
Thus, in truth, neutrality cannot be truly neutral, even though it is 
affirmed by supporters of neutrality as a form of neutrality. This impos-
sibility is caused because parties competing in a system or in a policy 
formulation will side with one of two or several competitors. When 
policies are formulated automatically, they will attract one competitor 
and reject the other. This includes when a value competes with another 
value. At one point, a value will be adopted and the other rejected 
(Breen 2009, 549–550). That is what has caused a number of political 
scholars, from liberals such as William Galston, Charles Larmore, and 
Bruce Ackerman, to acknowledge that policies or the selection of truly 
neutral values as envisioned by supporters of neutral states cannot actu-
ally be achieved (Breen 2009, 549).
Additionally, linking state neutrality, both in the form of neutrality 
of justification or neutrality of aim, to Pancasila also does not demon-
strate a valid argument. This is due to the historical characteristics of 
Pancasila itself, as interpreted by Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman, 
and Natsir, who wanted religion to influence all state policies. Wahid 
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Hasyim wanted it in the form of a struggle for Islamic values (Shari’a) 
that were active in state institutions and society, whereas Agus Salim 
wanted it in a more passive form of reviewing how regulatory state 
products and institutions did not come into conflict with basic religious 
values. That means, in fact, that the state is not always neutral. In cer-
tain circumstances, the state needs justification from the religious realm 
as the implementation of divinity, which became the first principle of 
Pancasila.
This also causes the neutrality of justification and aim, as deriva-
tives of public reason, to not always able to be used when interpreting 
Pancasila. For example, in LGBT cases, it will be difficult to apply the 
principle of public reason in the form of neutrality of justification or 
neutrality of aim. Pancasila wants the religious doctrine to influence 
the state whereas public reason does not because it is seen as incompat-
ible with neutrality of justification and aim. This shows that Pancasila 
and public reason and its derivatives, especially neutrality of justifica-
tion or of aim, are incompatible.
A similar case occurred in a debate about adultery that led to many 
intellectual debates between the groups that wanted an article of law to 
be included in the national legal regulations and groups that opposed it. 
One of the arguments used by the group rejecting sanctions for adultery 
was public reason, as they believed that religion does not affect the state, 
including the state authority to restrict and sanction adultery.
Third is the principle of substantial elements in religion (universal-
ism). The consequence that is often mentioned in terms of the relation 
between Pancasila and public reason is to raise the value of religion, 
which is considered universal, to leave a partial value that is considered 
as not representing togetherness. In Latif ’s view, this is described as 
the application of Pancasila as the embodiment of civil religion (Latif 
2011, 110).
The series of discourses that Latif brought were consistent with those 
brought by Nurcholish Madjid. Madjid himself was greatly influenced 
by Robert N. Bellah who was quite famous for the idea of civil religion. 
The question that then arose was whether it was right to take Bellah’s 
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concept of civil religion and draw Madjid’s conclusions that religion 
could only be drawn into the realm of the state as long as it affected 
universal issues?
The universalization that Nurcholish Madjid referred to was meant 
to draw religious teachings substantially closer. It is very close to the 
idea of Protestant ethics that is popular in the United States (US) and 
the idea of civil religion as put forward by Robert N. Bellah.8 According 
to Madjid, the US is the best example of drawing the line of Christian-
ity through the process of universalization so that it becomes something 
universal. Through the process of universalization, Christian values  that 
exist in US society appear to be not exclusive and can be accepted by 
groups outside of Christianity from something previously exclusive and 
particular. Values  such as freedom, legal order, personal rights, and hu-
man rights are universal things that can be understood by all interfaith 
circles. Thus, these values  later became a kind of civil religion, although 
the individual religious commitment of each individual was not lost. A 
person can still support human rights, freedom, and legal order from 
their respective religious bases. However, when drawn to a level that 
is no longer personal (political, legal, and public), the base becomes a 
civil religion with its universal value (Madjid 1998, 171–172).
Hence, it can be said that this universalization was then used by 
Madjid as one component of Pancasila relating to the interpretation of 
the divinity principle (Belief in the One and Only God). This can be 
seen from his conversation that presented the idea of universalization 
against the background of Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution. In fact, 
he encouraged Pancasila to adopt what was initiated by Bellah.
With Madjid’s explanation, one can see and understand the direc-
tion desired by those who want to raise the issue of universalism. Uni-
versalism can be said to be derivative or inseparable from the idea of 
public reason. Therefore, intellectuals who relate Pancasila to public 
reason often raise the idea of universalization as it was built by Nur-
cholish Madjid, who borrowed Bellah’s ideas, and later applied them in 
the context of Pancasila. He thinks that there is a belief that Pancasila 
8 Regarding the ideas of Robert N. Bellah concerning civil religion, see Bortolini (2012).
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and public reason are always directly proportional, even though it is 
not always so.
Such universalization efforts can be questioned because the rela-
tionship between Pancasila and religion does not always derive from 
universal ideas as evidenced by Latif and Madjid. A number of national 
founding fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman, and 
Natsir did not necessarily use universalization as the only way to explain 
the relationship between Pancasila and religion, as explained earlier 
regarding their attitude towards Islam.
Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 is one example that can show how univer-
salization with the characteristics of public reason does not always fit 
with Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution, so that in a moment of uni-
versalization it becomes invalid. This Law, when placed on a universal 
scale, instead represents the phenomenon of adopting religious ideas, 
because in a liberal country, religious sects that give new interpretations 
that are disassociated from the core doctrines of religion are not being 
restricted by the state, so they are different from what is applied in that 
Law. In Indonesia, the misinterpretation of religious principles can be 
seen as blasphemy.9
Liberal states did not apply restrictions because of the influence of 
Locke’s ideas. As a figure who viewed religion and state as different au-
thorities, Locke, a pioneer figure in 18th century Western liberalism, op-
posed religious and state restrictions on religious groups that interpreted 
religion differently to the main religion, though religious interpretations 
are an essential part of a religion. For Locke, religious restrictions are 
not universal, so restrictions cannot be applied to different religious 
groups. Locke agreed to restrictions on an activity if universal areas 
were affected, such as existence (life), health, ownership, and other 
freedoms. Restrictive authorities are carried out by state institutions 
rather than religious institutions (Alzate 2014, 225).
Besides, the idea of  religious universalism relates to secularization 
because religious universalism is another form of differentiation, as 
described by a number of sociologists such as Jose Casanova and Steve 
9 This happened to Ahmadiyah Indonesia. For the dynamics of the debate, see Burhani (2014).
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Bruce (Hood 2015, 244 and Bruce 2011, 49).10 The close relation be-
tween universalism and differentiation lies in the placement of religion 
in the domain of civil society, and given that religion cannot influence 
state politics, it only fills the political area of the state as an ideal and 
not as a doctrinal aspiration. When religion is separated in the area of 
civil society, it leaves the state to be filled with content that is consid-
ered universal. As explained by Nurcholish Madjid, religion was drawn 
to issues such as compliance to legal order, freedom, personal rights, 
and other kinds of freedom that became cross-religious issues. As men-
tioned by Casanova, differentiation is a variant of secularization which 
means a distinction between religious institutions (church institutions) 
and secular institutions (state, economy, science, art, entertainment, 
health, and welfare) whose process dates from pre-modern to contem-
porary (Casanova 2011, 54). Therefore, it is not appropriate for Latif 
to say that Indonesia (Pancasila), which is neither a secular state nor 
a religious state, is then aligned with the distinctive differentiation of 
Casanova (Latif 2011, 111) because Pancasila does not legitimize this 
form of secularization.
With this criticism, the future interpretation of Pancasila must aban-
don models such as anti-majoritarianism, the neutral state, and univer-
salism, which are not properly placed. The interpretation of Pancasila 
that must be developed is one that treats majoritarianism moderately, 
especially religious majoritarianism, because Pancasila is based on 
“Belief in the One and Only God.” The principles of majoritarianism 
must be considered and should not be violated, so that on a number 
of issues, it must be in favor of the majority (not the neutral state). 
Majoritarianism must be valued and can affect many policies. There 
should be no policies conflicting with religious doctrines, especially the 
majority religion. The impact of universalism must be put in its place 
without having to abandon the religious doctrines as interpretations 
10 Bruce and Casanova explained the term differentiation with slight differences. Although 
Bruce and Casanova’s general ideas about differentiation seem similar, Bruce explained dif-
ferentiation in the context where religious influences in the public sector are disappearing, 
whereas Casanova believed that such influences were still there, especially in civil society as 
he noticed a de-privatization of religion, not the other way around.
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of the principle of “Belief in the One and Only God.” However, this 
model of understanding does not mean adhering to majoritarianism, 
which is tyrannical and oppresses minorities. The impact of tyranny 
on minorities should be avoided as much as possible because one of 
the important principles of constitutionalism is protecting minorities.
CONCLUSIONS
The above discussion describes how relating the interpretation of 
Pancasila with public reason is not always right. Many aspects linked 
to the relationship between them are questionable in terms of their 
relevance because public reason itself provides certain derivative con-
sequences that can come under criticism. The three derivative con-
sequences, anti-majoritarianism, neutral state, and universalism, can-
not be applied to Pancasila, so the relationship between Pancasila and 
public reason is not always positive. In one aspect of Pancasila, it must 
avoid anti-majoritarianism, as practiced by almost all existing systems 
of ideas, including the one that dominates the world, liberalism, as long 
as majoritarianism is carried out without oppressing minority groups.
Pancasila, in certain regards, also shows that it cannot be described 
as neutral, as Pancasila indeed describes one variety of options, as other 
systems of ideas also do. Therefore, it cannot be considered as neutral. 
Moreover, to a certain degree, Pancasila must use religious justifica-
tions.
Finally, Pancasila cannot forever focus on universalism as a modus 
vivendi. This does not mean that Pancasila cannot be applied to univer-
sal issues. It can still be used as an approach to universal issues as long 
as it is not deterministic and stays true to its nature, which is to promote 
religious values. Evidently, Indonesia still treats certain matters in the 
realm of universalism, which are not all universalistic, as defined by a 
number of figures such as the idea of civil religion by Robert N. Bellah.
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